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Abstract 
Purpose: This study analyzes how board’s gender diversity, and more specifically a gender-
balanced configuration—i.e., a proportion of women in the boardroom ranging between 40% 
and 60%—affects economic and risk oriented performance in financial firms. 
Design/methodology/approach: The empirical application uses a rich dataset that includes 
detailed accounting and organizational information for all financial firms in the Costa Rican 
industry during the period 2000-2012. The proposed hypotheses are tested using panel data 
(fixed-effects) regression models that emphasize that bank performance is affected by various 
dimensions of the banks’ gender diversity. 
Findings: The longitudinal analysis of the Costa Rican banking industry reveals that, unlike a 
proportion indicating a particular critical mass of women on the board, a balanced gender 
configuration yields superior economic performance (ROA and net intermediation margin). 
Additionally, the findings show that the performance benefits of gender diversity only exists in 
the presence of a gender balanced board configuration, and that this positive effect is not 
conditioned by the presence of women leadership in the corporate hierarchy (Chair or CEO). 
Originality/value: The paper further explores the influence of board gender diversity on 
organizational performance by adopting an approach to the gender diversity-performance 
relationship that goes beyond the mere representation of women within the corporate hierarchy. 
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Balance rather than Critical Mass or Tokenism: Gender Diversity, Leadership and 
Performance in Financial Firms 
 
“Those arguing that women leaders are different, and better, may have the best of intentions. 
But they are piling flimsy evidence on dubious argument to produce politically correct hokum. 
In some societies, such claims risk reinforcing stereotypes about the sort of job that women are 
‘good for’. The only enlightened policy for selecting leaders is to judge people purely on their 
individual merits. Anything else is just prejudice in disguise.” 
—Brett Ryder (The Economist, ‘Sex in the boardroom’. June 6th, 2015).1
1. Introduction 
 
 
Women within leadership positions and board gender diversity are suspected to 
influence economic and risk-oriented performance metrics of organizations. Yet, empirical 
findings are less than conclusive (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Jeong and Harrison, 2017). In 
this study, we argue that the benefits of gender diversity in the upper echelons of organizations 
comes not from a mere token presence of women, nor from a position of absolute or 
proportional critical mass, as is found in previous empirical studies (Ararat et al., 2015; Joecks 
et al., 2013), but rather from a balanced gender distribution. Beyond the mere representation of 
women within leadership positions, or the pursuit of identifying a necessary critical mass, this 
paper analyzes the performance effect of having a balanced gender distribution. 
Gender diversity in boardrooms has increasingly drawn scholarly and policy-making 
attention (see, e.g., Adams et al., 2015; Joecks et al., 2013; Konrad et al., 2008; Terjesen et al., 
2009). The debate was fueled in 2006 by the obligatory introduction of a 40 percent quota of 
female directors in Norwegian listed companies (the law took force in 2006 and businesses were 
given two years to adjust: in April 2008 the Norwegian government announced full 
compliance). Following the spirit of this law, other developed countries—e.g., Belgium, France, 
Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain—have enacted similar (softer) regulatory frameworks. 
Underlying most of these legislative initiatives is the premise that the presence of women on 
boards could affect the governance of companies in significant ways. Notwithstanding the 
increased relevance of gender diversity in the boardroom for managers and policy makers, the 
large literature dealing with the effects on performance of gender diversity in boards and top 
management teams offers decidedly mixed results (for a comprehensive review of the literature 
see, e.g., the recent surveys by Post and Byron (2015) and Jeong and Harrison (2017)). 
                                                 
1 http://www.economist.com/news/business/21653626-claims-women-manage-differently-fromor-better-
thanmen-are-questionable-sex-boardroom 
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In this context, existing research in the field mostly focuses on the relationship between 
women representation in boardrooms and business performance, where the direction and 
intensity of this effect can be heterogeneous and industry specific (Brammer et al., 2009). 
Existing empirical studies show that by broadening the range of experience and 
expertise available to a team, diversity can promote team effectiveness. Consistent with this 
argument, research has found that, compared to homogeneous management teams, diverse 
executive teams are more innovative and adopt richer strategies (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), 
respond better to competitive threats (Hambrick et al., 1996), and are quicker to implement 
change (Adams and Funk, 2011). As opposed to a team diversity composed of ‘specialists’, a 
heterogeneous team composed of individuals with a greater breadth of experiences is found to 
have greater cognitive variety and to be better able to realizing the performance benefits linked 
to diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Gender diversity is a type of non-function specific 
diversity that is potentially conducive to such cognitive variety and to high performance 
management teams. 
But women are unlikely to have much impact on corporate performance unless they 
become a notable proportion of the corporate hierarchy. Only as their numbers increase will 
women be able to influence their male colleagues to accept and approve the distinct 
perspectives and policies promoted by women (Childs and Krook, 2008). For the representation 
of women to truly have an impact over the policies and therefore the performance of an 
organization some have proposed that a ‘critical mass’ of women must participate in order to get 
the collective to behave differently from the typical group (Oliver et al., 1985). However, the 
optimal proportion of women in the corporate upper echelon to maximize the performance of 
the firm has yet to be clearly identified.  
This study seeks to gain a deeper understanding of gender diversity in boardrooms by 
examining how the presence of women on boards and in the corporate hierarchy of a firm—i.e., 
chairperson and CEO—impacts various performance dimensions. Specifically, this study 
evaluates the effects of gender diversity on economic and risk-oriented performance metrics, 
while accounting for certain organizational features that might affect both the depth of gender 
diversity and performance. This paper therefore analyzes the performance effect of having a 
balanced gender distribution (40% < proportion of women in the boardroom < 60%), instead of 
mere representation, or the pursuit of identifying a necessary critical mass. 
The empirical application uses a rich dataset of Costa Rican banks during 2000-2012. 
This setting is attractive since it underwent important changes in the regulatory framework 
jointly with enhancements in monitoring practices. Moreover, the Costa Rican legislation does 
not impose ‘gender quotas’ that intervene in the gender composition of private boards, including 
those of financial institutions. The proposed analysis provides an opportunity to analyze how 
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gender diversity contributes to organizational performance in a context of increased women 
representation in boards where competitive conditions are complex and heterogeneous. 
This study looks into the role of gender diversity in boardrooms on various performance 
metrics, answering the call by Adams and Ferreira (2009) for more research on the effects of 
women representation in the board in relatively unexplored industries, such as financial 
institutions. Furthermore, this study complements the literature dealing with the effects of 
women’s representation in the upper level of management and performance in Latin American 
economies (see, e.g., Mullins, 2005; Flabbi et al., 2017). By connecting two dimensions of 
gender diversity—i.e., board heterogeneity and leadership—and banking performance in an 
emerging market this study contribute to further interlock and enrich these two perspectives, 
which are critical to scholars and policy makers, and which are compatible with managerial 
decision-making processes. 
More concretely, this paper questions the impact of mere representation of women and 
the critical mass arguments to the gender composition of corporate boards and argue that 
balanced gender diversity optimizes performance. The results of the study contribute to the 
debate on the role of gender balanced board diversity. Financial firms with such gender balance 
report superior economic performance. This is the case even in comparison to financial firms 
with female leadership. 
The remainder of the document is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the literature on gender diversity in boards and in top management positions and 
performance. Section 3 presents an overview of the Costa Rican financial industry. Section 4 
describes the data and methodology used in the study. Empirical results are found in Section 5, 
while Section 6 presents the discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical foundations and hypotheses formulation 
This section elaborates on the literature dealing with gender diversity and organizational 
performance. The section first defines gender diversity according to the existing literature. Next, 
a review of empirical research regarding the two dimensions of gender diversity analyzed in this 
study is presented: female representation in boards and women in leadership positions. 
Heterogeneity in boardrooms can be determined in different ways. Some papers propose 
a distinction between (1) demographic and (2) cognitive diversity (Erhardt et al., 2003). 
Demographic aspects are observable attributes as age, race and ethnicity. Cognitive diversity is 
less observable and relates to knowledge, education, values, perceptions and personality 
characteristics. Another regularly used classification is (1) job-related and (2) non-job-related 
heterogeneity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Naranjo‐Gil et al., 2008). In this case non-job-related 
aspects are closely linked to demographic features. Gender diversity is part of the non-job-
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related and demographic categorization. It is only one of the multiple aspects of diversity but 
one, such as ethnicity, which is ethically sensitive when it comes to the principle of equality of 
treatment. The pursuit of this equality treatment leads to the assumption of tokenism (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009), and skepticism that gender diverse boards are a case for moral or social 
legitimacy thus not a valid economic argument (Chapple and Humphrey, 2014). Hence, it is 
necessary to deepen rational reasoning in order to overturn the glass ceiling, a phenomenon that 
keeps women (and other minorities) from reaching top ranks in firms (Adams et al., 2015). This 
glass ceiling is best witnessed in the corporate hierarchy, with 18.7% of World Bank globally 
surveyed firms having female participation on their top management team (World Bank, 2014). 
As the board of directors represents an influential entity over (1) the strategy and 
decision making-process, and (2) the monitoring/controlling of executives on behalf of the 
shareholders, the functioning of the board of directors is highly related to organizational 
performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Therefore, it is relevant to investigate how gender 
representation affects this functioning, and subsequently the performance of the organization. 
Gender representation refers to the amount or proportion of women to men in the corporate 
hierarchy. Most research analyses the gender diversity/performance relationship in developed 
economies. Few studies do so in emerging markets (e.g., Mahadeo et al. (2012) in Mauritius; 
Liu et al. (2014) in China; Ararat et al. (2015) in Turkey; and Nguyen et al. (2015) in Vietnam) 
or, more concretely, in Latin American settings (e.g., Mullings (2005) for five Caribbean 
islands; and the extensive work by Flabbi et al. (2017) in 31 Latin American economies). 
 
2.1 Dimension 1: Female board of directors’ representation 
There are numerous studies reporting no significant relation between gender diversity 
and performance. For example Erhardt et al. (2003) find a non-significant relationship between 
board diversity and performance (ROA and ROI); while Naranjo‐Gil et al. (2008) show that 
non-job-related heterogeneity (e.g. gender diversity) is not associated to performance. Also, in 
their analysis of businesses listed on the FTSE350 during 1996-2011, Gregory-Smith et al. 
(2014) find no significant link between gender diversity and performance. 
Some studies also report a negative impact of gender diversity on performance. Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) find that gender diversity negatively affects performance in firms with 
weaker defense (take-over) control mechanisms. Mateos de Cabo et al., (2011) report a negative 
relationship between gender board diversity and performance in publicly traded companies.  
Likewise there is an equal amount of studies revealing a positive relationship between 
women representation in boards and performance (Brammer et al., 2009; Mahadeo et al., 2012). 
Post and Byron (2015) conducted an exhaustive meta-analysis of 140 studies linking board 
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gender diversity and performance to conclude that no significant link, neither positive nor 
negative, exists between both variables. 
Several studies explain this ambiguity in the results arguing that the relationship 
between women representation in boards and performance is non-linear (S- or U-shaped) (Ali et 
al., 2014; Ararat et al., 2015; Joecks et al., 2013). Post and Byron (2015) recognized that a 
limitation of their meta-analysis was that it did not allow them to test non-linear relations 
between gender diversity and performance, which may explain the study’s lack of significant 
results. Such non-linear relationship is in line with the critical mass theory by Kanter (1977). 
For a physicist, the ‘critical mass’ is the threshold of radioactive material that is needed for a 
nuclear fission explosion to occur. Social scientists have used the expression to refer to the 
minimum tipping point of participants required before a social phenomenon can take hold 
(Oliver et al., 1985). 
Kanter’s (1977) theory of critical mass is one of the most used for the study of gender-
diversity. Applied to diversity, Kanter’s critical mass theory splits groups in four categories 
based on a dominant and minority sub-group: (1) uniform (0% minority), (2) skewed (up to 
20% minority), (3) tilted (20 to 40% minority), and (4) balanced (40-60% balanced). The theory 
predicts that the effects of any minority group should start to be visible somewhere in the tilted 
ratio as tokenism disappears and minority members can ally to influence the group’s culture. 
Although Kanter (1977) used the case of women employees to build her argument, her thesis 
proposed that the critical mass benefits of diversity applied for any workforce minority group 
within the firm (Childs and Krook, 2008). Contrary to what is often assumed, the ‘benefits’ of 
the critical mass theory originally had little to do with firm performance, but rather supposed a 
greater decision-making that would serve the particular benefit of members of the minority 
group (Kanter, 1977). Kanter did not empirically test her theory nor give any precision as to the 
exact proportion of any particular minority within a group that would constitute an effective 
critical mass. This theory has nevertheless been prominently used within the gender diversity 
literature linking diversity to performance. 
Joecks et al. (2013, p. 70) determine, based on their research of 151 listed German 
firms, that: “a more gender diverse board composition will only enhance performance if 
diversity is sufficiently large… and that only for boards with a critical level…, performance will 
be over and above the one of male boards.” Liu et al. (2014) uncover a similar pattern of critical 
mass in their study of gender diversity in a Chinese context. 
In their research on the effects of female board members on firms’ perceived reputation, 
Brammer et al. (2009) acknowledge that the presence of women on the board is favorably 
viewed in only those sectors that operate close to final consumers. For the financial services 
industry, although having 66% of female workforce in their UK-sample of 2004, Brammer et al. 
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(2009) find no effect regarding financial services industry. This is in line with Chapple and 
Humphrey (2014) who report that in some industries diversity is positively correlated with 
performance but that in the financial industry results are mixed. On contrary, García-Meca et al. 
(2015) find that banks with greater gender diversity achieve superior productivity. This 
reinforces Ali et al. (2014) results on the effects of gender diversity on labor productivity. 
But when it comes to bank performance, results are not so clear (Ararat et al., 2015; Liu 
et al., 2014; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2015). One of the reasons for this is that the 
proportion of women participation, or critical mass, is not homogeneous. This is in-fact a 
problem with the critical mass theory. Kanter (1977) left the necessary critical mass open for 
variance within a range that stretched anywhere from 20% to 40% of the total, where it is 
argued that the higher the proportion within the group the more the influence over social 
experiences (Childs and Krooks, 2008). Those studies that do seem to confirm the relationship 
between board gender diversity and bank performance are found to link very high proportions 
of women board participation, which from Kanter’s perspective would have been categorized as 
‘Balanced’. Landel (2016) as well as several non-academic studies (Credit Suisse, 2016; World 
Economic Forum, 2016) are increasingly providing evidence that true performance 
improvements from board gender diversity come only with a balanced gender distribution 
within the upper corporate hierarchy of the organization. As Elizabeth May, Leader of the 
Canadian Green Party, once said of gender balance in government (May, 2015: 1) “50 per cent 
female cabinet appointments lead to 5000 per cent increase in guys who suddenly care about 
merit in cabinet”. The same could be said of the corporate world. Therefore, more than 
tokenism or any range of critical mass, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: Balanced gender board diversity leads to greater firm performance 
 
2.2 Dimension 2: Women in leadership positions 
As mentioned in the introduction, gender effects on the performance of boards are often 
related to (1) female representation (ratios), or (2) to core differences in the behavior of men and 
women. This latter literature tries to determine differences in characteristics, traits and 
leadership styles. Some of these studies have suggested that women are more risk averse (Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008), better at monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and more long-term 
oriented (Silverman, 2003). For banking services, Bellucci et al. (2010) find that female loan 
officers are more risk-averse and/or less self-confident than male officers. Bertrand and Hallock 
(2001) assume that such unobservable differences are minimized in the group of top executives 
since men and women are likely to share high level of job motivation and high career ambitions. 
Hence, the projection of these gender stereotypes is sometimes associated with the existence of 
the glass-ceiling (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2011). Also Adams and Ferreira (2009) find ‘group 
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effects’ of female representation in board of directors—as critical mass theory—with individual 
effects of female in leadership position as Chairperson, CEO, or other executive roles. 
This line of thinking flows out of some of the developments of the critical mass theory 
that came from the field of political science. Dahlerup (1988) suggested that the available 
empirical evidence simply did not support the relationship between a specific percentage of 
women and change. She suggested that change lay in ‘critical acts’, or initiatives of women 
(Child and Krook, 2008). Change as a result of the participation of women in the hierarchies of 
organizations depends on ‘the willingness and ability' of women (Dahlerup, 1988, p. 296). This 
shifted the causation of outcomes from the notion of ‘critical mass’ to a one that depended much 
more on the actions of particular individuals in positions of leadership (Child and Krook, 2008). 
Exploring women in top corporate leadership positions is therefore warranted. The 
impact of women in these specific roles is of much interest as their leadership style directly 
affects strategy, decision-making, the corporate culture and, ultimately, firm performance 
(Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). The study of Adams and Funk (2011) is one of the few that focuses 
solely on directors’ characteristics. Their research supports the argument that gender differences 
matter; however, the methodology is based on a self-reported survey and was not intended to 
find differences in performance. In a recent study focused on women CEOs and Chairs in the 
U.S. banking industry, Palvia et al. (2015) observed that women CEOs hold more conservative 
capital levels, and that small banks with women CEOs and/or Chairs were less likely to fail. 
However, empirical evidence from 147 different studies compiled by Jeong and 
Harrison (2017) does not support the view that women CEO can positively influence 
performance. It could be assumed that at these crucial leadership roles any tokenism disappears 
and hiring is solely performed on base of skills and abilities (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). 
Wolfers (2006) confirms this argument by finding no effect of women CEOs on performance 
for S&P 500 firms over the period of 1992-2004. Adams and Funk (2011) suspect that industry- 
or country- level differences can be observed if CEO femininity is seen as a comparative 
advantage. Thus, when it comes to the impact of women over performance, evidence appears 
more heavily stacked on the side of adopting balanced gender distribution within the corporate 
hierarchy rather than the tokenism of ‘critical acts’ that may be carried out by women in top 
position of organizational leadership. Therefore, the prior hypothesis is reinforced as follows: 
H2: Firms with a gender-balanced board show superior performance, irrespective of 
whether a woman holds a leadership position in the top of the corporate hierarchy. 
 
3. The Costa Rican banking industry 
Similar to other developing economies, the Costa Rican government promoted the 
deregulation of the banking industry seeking to improve monitoring activities as well as to 
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enhance competitiveness (IMF, 2013; Yildirim and Philippatos 2007). The Costa Rican banking 
industry has gone through various reforms. Among these reforms was the creation in 1995 of an 
independent supervisory agent linked to the Costa Rican Central Bank (Superintendent of 
Financial Entities, SUGEF). The function of this agency was to improve the transparency of 
financial firms. Another significant reform was the introduction of the CAMELS rating 
framework in 2001 to further enhance the monitoring of financial firms’ activities (IMF, 2003; 
SUGEF, 2000). A detailed description of the entire deregulation process of the Costa Rican 
banking industry is presented in Epure and Lafuente (2015). 
The SUGEF monitors all types of financial firms in the market, including: state-owned 
commercial banks, private banks, mutual banks, cooperative banks, financial conglomerates, 
financial (non-banking) firms, credit unions and currency exchange offices. Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of this paper, the analysis focuses on those banks that operate under the same 
market conditions, in terms of regulation: the state-owned commercial banks, private banks, 
mutual banks and cooperative banks.  
There are various characteristics of the Costa Rican banking industry that are worth 
mentioning. First, the four types of financial firms analyzed in this study operate under the same 
regulatory regime. Financial laws have also introduced transparency mechanisms that facilitate 
the access to detailed information on financial operations and organizational architecture. 
Second, regulation restricts the composition of the board of directors, and all board members 
have to be outsiders; that is, directors cannot hold any position in the financial firm (CEO, top 
management team, middle managers, or any other position) (Epure and Lafuente, 2015). 
Third, efforts of the Costa Rican administration to combat gender discrimination started 
in 1990 with the enactment of the Gender Equality Act (Ley de Promoción de la Igualdad Social 
de la Mujer No. 7142).‘Gender quotas’ were first legislated in 1996 by promoting a 40% quota 
of women across public levels of governance (local and national) and across political parties 
(Ley de Reforma del Código Electoral y Ley Orgánica de Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones No. 
7653). Recently, further reforms have sought to promote similar ‘gender quotas’ (minimum 
40%) in the boardroom of solidarity associations, civil organizations and labor unions (Ley de 
Porcentaje mínimo de mujeres que deben integrar las Directivas de Asociaciones, Sindicatos y 
Asociaciones Solidaristas No. 8901).  
Despite these reforms, it is important to highlight that the Costa Rican legislation does 
not impose any ‘gender quota’ that artificially increases women’s participation in boards and 
top management positions of private organizations, including financial firms.  
In conclusion, the Costa Rican financial legislation promotes greater transparency, as 
well as the separation of decision rights by imposing both the nomination of fully outside 
boards and a two-tier leadership structure among financial firms. Nevertheless, decisions related 
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to the appointment of women in top positions of the corporate hierarchy (boardroom or top 
management team) continue to be entirely endogenous at the financial firm level. 
 
4. Sample, variable definition and method 
4.1 Sample 
The data used in this study comes from the publicly available datasets of the Costa 
Rican Central Bank, and includes detailed accounting and organizational information for all 
financial firms in the industry during the period 2000-2012. As a result of a limited number of 
business entries—i.e., two private banks started operations in 2007 and 2010; and one 
cooperative bank was created in 2007—and exits—i.e., one mutual bank in 2005; five private 
banks in 2001, 2004, 2006, and 2012; and three cooperative banks in 2003 and 2009—reported 
during the period under analysis, the total number of financial institutions in Costa Rica 
changed from 48 in 2000 to 42 in 2012. Therefore, the study employs an unbalanced panel that 
encompasses all state-owned, private, mutual and cooperative banks that operate in the industry. 
The final sample includes information for 571 firm-year observations (2000= 48 cases; 2001-
2002= 47 cases; 2003= 46 cases; 2004-2006= 42 cases; 2007-2011= 43 cases; 2012= 42 cases). 
At this point, it should be noted that the state-owned banks are fully controlled by the 
Costa Rican government; however, and according to the regulatory framework, they are 
considered independent firms since politicians cannot influence their managerial decisions. In 
terms of market share, this group controlled 54 % of the deposits in 2012. The second group 
includes private commercial banks. In 2012, this group attracted 29 % of the deposits. The third 
group is formed by the mutual banks, which in 2012 had 7% of the deposits. Note that, similarly 
to the state-owned banks, the deposits of mutual banks are guaranteed by the government. The 
last group consists of cooperative banks. Although these financial firms are owned by their 
cooperative members, they offer financial services to any type of customer. In 2012 these firms 
accounted for 10% of the deposits. 
 
4.2 Variable definition 
Performance. This study uses three accounting metrics to capture the performance of 
financial firms. First, two variables are used to measure economic performance: the rate of 
return on assets (ROA) defined as the ratio of net profit divided by total assets; and the net 
intermediation margin (NIM), which is calculated as the difference between interest income and 
interest expense relative to total assets. Second, risk performance is measured via the non-
performing loans ratio (NPL), expressed as the non-performing loans divided by total loans. 
Note that, following the regulation set by the SUGEF (SUGEF, 2000), non-performing loans are 
credit operations—i.e., mortgages, commercial loans or corporate loans—past due for at least 
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90 days. These performance variables have been used in prior research on bank performance 
(e.g., Banker et al., 2010; Epure and Lafuente, 2015). Descriptive statistics for the study 
variables are presented in Table 1, while Table A1 in the Appendix shows the correlation 
matrix. 
Gender diversity in the board. For each analyzed year, the database used in this study 
includes detailed information on the board of directors of Costa Rican financial firms, including 
names, date of appointment and contract termination date for all board members. The level of 
disaggregation in the data permits an in-depth analysis of the effect on performance of various 
measures of board’s gender diversity. First, the study employs the ratio of women directors 
divided by the total number of directors to measure boards’ gender diversity, that is, the 
women’s representation in the boardroom. The rate of women directors constitutes the most 
widely used variable to analyze the effects of gender diversity on performance (see, e.g., Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Chappel and Humphrey, 2014). From Table 1 it can be seen that the 
sampled banks have, on average, 16.91% of women directors. Additionally, Figure 1 shows 
how the proportion of women on the board of Costa Rican financial firms has systematically 
increased between 2007 (proportion of women directors: 18.05%) and 2012 (proportion of 
women directors: 21.58%). Second, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
proportion of women directors ranges between 40% and 60% is introduced, that is, the board 
has a gender balanced configuration (40% < women directors < 60%). 
 
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
 
Women’s leadership in the corporate hierarchy. The study includes a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if a woman chairs the board of directors. In addition, a dummy 
variable identifies if the top executive (CEO) of the analyzed financial firms is a woman. 
 Control variables. All model specifications control for bank size, board size, capital 
adequacy and time. Bank size is measured as total assets, expressed in millions of 2012 constant 
Costa Rican colones. Board size is defined as the total number of directors. Note that, in all 
regression models, the variables ‘bank size’ and ‘board size’ are logged to reduce skewness. 
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is computed as equity plus risk-weighted reserved divided by 
total assets. Finally, a set of time dummy variables is included to rule out the potential effect of 
time trends and changes in the economic conditions among the sample financial firms during 
the analyzed period. Note that, in all regression models, all time varying control variables are 
lagged one period to control for potential endogeneity problems. 
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4.3 Method 
The study employs panel data techniques to estimate the model which emphasizes that 
bank performance is affected by various dimensions of the banks’ gender diversity. Pooling 
repeated observations on the same unit of analysis violate the assumption of independence of 
observations, resulting in autocorrelation in the residuals. First-order autocorrelation occurs 
when the disturbances in one period are correlated with those in the previous period, resulting in 
incorrect variance estimates, rendering ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates inefficient and 
biased (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, coefficients are estimated via fixed-effects panel data 
models with robust standard errors to correct for autocorrelation of disturbances due to constant 
firm-specific effects (Greene, 2003). 
To evaluate the role of the analyzed gender diversity factors empirically, a baseline 
model estimates the performance of financial firms as a function of the gender diversity of the 
board and the gender of members of the corporate hierarchy (CEO/Chair). More formally, 
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In equation (1) j  are parameter estimates for the jth independent variable,  is the 
time-invariant business-specific effect that controls for unobserved heterogeneity across 
financial firms (i) and that is uncorrelated with parameter estimates; and  is the normally 
distributed error term that varies cross-observations and cross-time (t). The variable ‘gender 
diversity’ refers to the proportion of women directors, while three dummy variables are used to 
measure ‘women leadership’: a dummy taking the value of one if a woman is the CEO, a 
dummy taking the value of one if a woman is the Chair, and a dummy variable equal to one if a 
woman is the CEO or the Chair. Control variables include bank size measured as the log of total 
assets, board size expressed as the log value of the number of directors, and the capital 
adequacy ratio that controls for risk management. The variable ‘Time’ refers to the set of time 
dummy variables. All time-varying variables are lagged one period to avoid potential 
endogeneity problems. 
Next, a full model incorporating the interaction term between the variables linked to the 
gender balanced board and women leadership is proposed. This model has the following form: 
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In equation (2), the variable ‘gender balanced board’ takes the value of one if the 
proportion of women on the board is between 40% and 60%, and the variable ‘women 
leadership’ is a dummy taking the value of one if a woman is the CEO or the Chairperson.  
In terms of our hypotheses, a result of 1 0   for the ‘gender balanced board’ variable 
(equation (2)) will corroborate that a balanced gender configuration outperforms structures with 
lower proportions of women directors (H1). Also, the second hypothesis (H2) that states that 
firms with a gender-balanced board show superior performance levels, irrespective of whether a 
woman holds a leadership position in the top of the corporate hierarchy will be confirmed if 
1 0   and 12 0   (equation (2)). 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Gender diversity and performance in financial firms 
The results of the study are presented in Table 2 where three different dependent 
performance variables are modeled: Return of Assets (ROA), Net intermediation margin (NIM), 
and the bank’s bad loan ratio. For each of the three dependent variables, two different 
specifications were calculated. The first model specification includes the rate of women board 
participation; the presence of chairwomen-led boards; and women CEO-led management teams, 
together with the mentioned control variables that profile the banking institutions observed. The 
second specification distinguishes banks with gender-balanced boards and those with women-
leadership (combining banks with women-led boards with those with women-led management 
teams). The full model (specification 3) incorporates the interaction term between the variables 
linked to the gender balanced board and women leadership 
It can be observed how fluctuations in the proportion of women within the boards of 
Costa Rican banks do not have any significant influence over any of the three performance 
variables being analyzed. Therefore, confirming arguments contrary to tokenistic representation 
of women in board, the linear relationship between board gender diversity and performance is 
not significant. 
 
---- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
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However, a gender-balanced board is found to have a positive significant impact over 
the economic performance of Costa Rican financial firms (ROA and NIM). This relation was 
not found to be significant when bad loan ratio is the dependent variable. These results confirm 
the study’s hypothesis (H1) that states that a gender-balanced board leads to greater firm 
performance: at least when it comes to ROA or the intermediation margin.  
In the case of the importance of women leadership for firm performance, the results of 
the study show that Costa Rican financial firms with women-led boards or with women-led 
management teams (CEO) realize lower bad loan ratios. However, these women-led financial 
firms do not benefit from any significant difference in their ROA or NIM performance level. 
This would therefore lend to the acknowledgement that the ‘critical acts’ of women in the 
corporate hierarchy of Costa Rican financial firms does influence performance, but only when 
this performance is interpreted through the banks’ risk management. Additionally, the result in 
model 3 of Table 2 shows that the coefficient linked to a gender-balanced board is statistically 
significant, while the interaction term between the ‘gender-balance board’ variable and the 
‘women leadership’ variable is not significant. Therefore, the results confirm the model’s 
second hypothesis (H2) that even in the absence of women leadership, a balanced gender board 
leads to greater firm performance. But as was the case for the interpretation of the previous 
hypothesis H1, this is only the case for economic performance (ROA and NIM). The opposite is 
true when measuring performance through the lens of a financial firms’ bad loan ration. 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
This sub-section presents the results of a number of robustness checks evaluating the 
linearity of the gender diversity-performance relationship, the suitability of the proposed gender 
diversity variables compared to alternative metrics, and the potential endogeneity of gender 
diversity among the study financial institutions. 
Linearity in the relationship between gender diversity and performance.—First, we 
considered the possibility that the relationship between board’s gender diversity and 
performance is non-linear. To verify this, the quadratic term of the proportion of women 
directors was added to equation (1). Results—presented in Table A2 of the Appendix—for the 
linear and squared term of the proportion of women directors are not significant. For the three 
analyzed performance variables, this result reinforces the proposed analysis of the relationship 
between the proportion of women directors and performance (Table 2). 
Alternatives measures of gender diversity.—The second robustness check tests for the 
potential effect on performance of alternative gender configurations of boards, in terms of the 
proportion of women directors. In this case, and similar to Joecks et al. (2013), four spline 
variables are introduced to account for different levels of gender diversity in the board: fully-
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men controlled (0% women directors), skewed (<20% of women directors), tilted (20% < 
women directors <40%) and balanced (40% < women directors < 60%). By introducing the 
spline variables in equation (1), the model can evaluate the effect of independent segments of an 
interval variable, in our case the rate of women directors (Greene, 2003). Table A3 in the 
Appendix shows descriptive statistics for the board’s gender distribution among the analyzed 
financial firms, according to the abovementioned categories. The findings of the analysis (Table 
A4 in the Appendix) reveal that gender board diversity and performance are in-fact only 
positively related in the case of ‘balanced’ (40%-60%) gender distribution within the observed 
boards. The link between gender diversity and performance is not found to be significant in the 
case of skewed (<20%) or tilted (20%-40%) levels of board diversity (Kanter, 1977). This goes 
to show that it is in fact a balanced board, rather than any proportion indicating a particular 
critical mass of women board participation, what matters for superior economic performance 
(ROA and NIM) of Costa Rican financial firms. 
Endogeneity of gender diversity.—Our empirical strategy (equations (1) and (2)) 
addresses endogeneity concerns related to reverse causality (first endogeneity problem) by 
lagging one period all explanatory variables. But, our models do not account for the potential 
endogeneity of boards’ gender configuration (second endogeneity problem). In this discussion, 
literature rooted in the management and corporate governance frames emphasize that the 
boards’ gender diversity—in our case, the proportion of women in the board and a balanced 
gender configuration—can be explained by the presence of a Chairwoman (see, e.g., Smith and 
Parrotta, 2018; Terjesen et al., 2009). Underlying this ‘women-led’ hypothesis is the assumption 
that the (unintended) social mechanisms driving ‘gender stereotypes’ condition firms’ behavior, 
and that the low presence of women in boards is the statistical manifestation of this male-led 
stereotyping effect (Kanter, 1977). In this sense, Ruigrok et al. (2006), Kaczmarek et al. (2012) 
and Smith and Parrotta (2018) argue that the presence of a woman as Chairperson may alleviate 
such stereotyped views of the profile of board members and, in turn, may increase the presence 
of women in boardrooms. This argument is in line with Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Huse et 
al. (2009) who stress that, besides having women in the board, women should have the capacity 
to influence decision making for gender diversity to affect the functioning of the board. 
The econometric problem caused by the endogeneity of the predictor variables linked to 
boards’ gender configuration may have relevant implications for our study. The selection of 
appropriate instruments is a hard task (Wooldridge, 2002); however, the theory presented above 
offers solid arguments to argue that the presence of a Chairwoman is a valid instrument for 
boards’ gender configuration. Therefore, by testing the women-led hypothesis (Kanter, 1977) 
the last robustness check deals with the potential endogeneity of boards’ gender configuration. 
The estimated two-stage least squares (2SLS) model has the following form: 
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In equations (3.1) and (3.2), we use two variables to measure the ‘board’s gender 
configuration’: the rate of women on the board and a dummy equal to one if the proportion of 
women on the board is between 40% and 60% (gender balanced board), Note that, in order to 
avoid ‘double-counting’ and collinearity problems, we re-computed the variables related to the 
board’s gender configuration by excluding the Chairperson from the calculation. 
The variable ‘Chairwoman’ is a dummy taking the value of one if a woman is the 
Chairperson. The set of control variables are the same used in equations (1) and (2). To control 
for the first endogeneity problem (reverse causality) all time-varying variables in equation (3.1) 
are lagged one period, while the instrument ‘Chairwoman’ in equation (3.2) is lagged 2 periods.  
Concerning the computation approach, we use a standard 2SLS procedure to estimate 
equations (3.1) and (3.2) when the dependent variable is the rate of women in the board. For the 
‘gender-balanced’ dummy, we follow the approach proposed by Wooldridge (2002, p. 623-
624): we first obtained the fitted probabilities for the ‘gender-balanced’ variable (Z) by running 
a probit model using as predictor the ‘Chairwoman’ variable; second, we estimated equations 
(3.1) and (3.2) by 2SLS using as instrument the fitted probabilities (Z) in equation (3.2). 
The results of the 2SLS models are presented in Table A5 of the Appendix. In line with 
Ruigrok et al. (2006) and Kaczmarek et al. (2012), the findings confirm that ‘women-led’ banks 
(i.e., with a woman serving as Chairperson) have a higher rate of women in the boardroom and 
are more likely to have a gender-balanced board. Additionally, although the significance of 
parameter estimates is weaker, the effects reported in Panel A are consistent with the results in 
Table 2: a gender-balanced board is conducive to performance (ROA and NIM). 
The objective of this supplementary test was to show that our empirical results 
constitute a robust analysis of the relationship between gender diversity and banks’ 
performance. The core findings of this exercise further validate the interpretations in the 
regression models presented above in sub-section 5.1 (Table 2). 
 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This study proposes that a balanced gender configuration of the board of directors 
explains the effect of boards’ gender diversity on performance. Furthermore, it is argued that the 
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positive performance repercussions of a balanced gender configuration within boards are not 
conditioned by the presence of women leadership in the corporate hierarchy (Chair or CEO). 
The proposed approach offers a compelling vision of the gender diversity-performance 
relationship that goes beyond the mere representation of women within the corporate hierarchy, 
or the pursuit of identifying a necessary critical mass, and focuses on the performance effect of 
having a balanced gender distribution within the board of directors. 
This study provides further evidence that contributes to understand how the gender 
configuration of the board is connected to organizational performance. Organizations do not 
realize the generally positive effects of greater levels of board diversity at the same intensity. 
Overall, the findings are consistent with our argument that emphasizes that, unlike a proportion 
indicating a particular critical mass of women on the board, a balanced gender configuration 
yields to superior economic performance. Additionally, results reveal that the positive effect of 
a gender-balanced board on performance is not conditioned by the presence of a woman in the 
top of the corporate hierarchy (Chair or CEO). 
This paper has important implication for scholars and policy makers. From an academic 
perspective, prior research has emphasized the role of a critical mass of women on the board to 
materialize the potentially positive effects of a more diverse board (e.g., Konrad et al., 2008; 
Torchia et al., 2011; Joercks et al., 2013). The results not only constitute a clear case against 
tokenism on boards, but also reveal that superior economic performance is achieved primarily 
by firms with a gender-balanced board. Additionally, the evidence suggests the presence of 
different risk management practices in gender balanced boards, which supports prior findings 
suggesting that women have different risk perceptions that influence their managerial decision-
making (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Bellucci et al., 2010). By analyzing the relationship 
between gender diversity and performance in a non-regulated context, this study contributes to 
the growing literature on the performance effects of gender diversity in emerging markets 
(Ararat et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014; Mahadeo et al., 2012) and, more 
specifically, in Latin American contexts (Flabbi et al., 2017; Mullings, 2005). 
For policy makers, the results of the study give support to a growing number of 
regulations calling for balanced gender distribution of corporate boards. Beyond the ethical and 
moral arguments motivating such regulations, the study’s findings add economic arguments to 
this type of legislation. But, the debate is open, and caution should be advised as the results of 
the study do not allow us to extrapolate that superior economic performance of firms with a 
gender-balanced board will be maintained following the enactment of ‘gender balance’ 
legislations. Our results indicate that a gender balanced board translates in superior economic 
performance. Because of the potentially enriching effects of a diverse board (Adams et al., 
2015; Brammer et al., 2009), investors need to turn their attention to the benefits of more 
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diverse boards, in terms of increased knowledge stock, and open the door for promoting the 
inclusion of a greater number of women on boards. 
A series of limitations to the present study that, in turn, represent avenues for future 
research should be mentioned. First, like other studies on gender diversity (see, e.g., Joecks et 
al., 2013; Torchia et al., 2011), the data do not permit the direct analysis of the underlying 
decision-making process within financial firms. The study presents various interpretations of 
how gender diversity impacts performance; however, we do not evaluate how organizations 
select and recruit new board members (men and women), nor do we assess the processes 
through which boards and top executives implement new strategies and how these actions 
impact performance. Further research on these issues would be valuable. For example, future 
studies should evaluate whether the effect of gender diversity on performance is related to the 
experience—i.e., tenure—and the specific human capital level of board members and top 
executives. Second, specifically designed future research should analyze if the recruitment 
process of women directors and top executives is subject to different rules, compared to those 
applied to men candidates. 
Finally, the findings in this study are based on the longitudinal analysis of Costa Rican 
financial institutions. Obviously, we cannot establish that the findings are generalizable to all 
financial institutions, or whether they generalize to businesses operating in other industries or 
settings. The sampled financial institutions may have idiosyncratic characteristics that impacted 
both their patterns of performance and the composition of their boards. Therefore, the results 
presented in this study are open to future verification. In this sense, future work should evaluate 
our arguments on the relevance of a gender balanced board—instead of tokenism in boards—for 
enhanced performance in financial and non-financial businesses using data for a wider array of 
industries operating in different geographic contexts. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the selected variables 
 Mean Standard deviation Q1 Q3 
ROA 0.0202 0.0265 0.0094 0.0258 
Net intermediation margin 0.0648 0.0315 0.0424 0.0803 
Bad loan ratio 0.0166 0.0318 0.0056 0.0205 
Proportion of women directors 0.1691 0.1641 0.0000 0.2857 
Proportion of men controlled boards  
(100%) 0.3485 0.4769 0.0000 1.0000 
Proportion of skewed boards  
(<=20%) 0.2417 0.4285 0.0000 0.0000 
Proportion of tilted boards  
(21%-40%) 0.3012 0.4592 0.0000 1.0000 
Proportion of balanced boards  
(41%-60%) 0.1086 0.3114 0.0000 0.0000 
Woman as chairperson 0.0385 0.1926 0.0000 0.0000 
Woman as CEO 0.1103 0.3136 0.0000 0.0000 
Bank size (total assets) 241413.30 587990.20 5919.26 178366.80 
Board size (number of directors) 7.5604 1.4257 7.0000 9.0000 
Capital adequacy ([equity + risk-
weighted reserved] / total assets) 0.2213 0.1475 0.1162 0.2838 
Monetary values (total assets) are expressed in millions of 2012 Costa Rican Colones, and are deflated 
with respect to inflation. Sample size: 571 firm-year observations. 
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Table 2. Fixed-effects regression results: Gender diversity and performance 
 Return on assets (ROA) Net intermediation margin (NIM) Bad loan ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Rate of women in the 
board 
0.0031 
(0.0084)  
 0.0051 
(0.0074)  
 –0.0042 
(0.0088)  
 
Chairwoman –0.0066 (0.0042)  
 –0.0055 
(0.0038)  
 –0.0034* 
(0.0019)  
 
Woman as CEO –0.0011 (0.0077)  
 –0.0038 
(0.0034)  
 –0.0082** 
(0.0037)  
 
Gender balanced 
board  
0.0043* 
(0.0025) 
0.0061* 
(0.0033)  
0.0062** 
(0.0028) 
0.0075** 
(0.0036)  
0.0002 
(0.0026) 
0.0001 
(0.0030) 
Woman leadership 
(Chair or CEO)  
–0.0035 
(0.0028) 
–0.0008 
(0.0055)  
–0.0045 
(0.0039) 
–0.0025 
(0.0041)  
–0.0062*** 
(0.0023) 
–0.0064** 
(0.0030) 
Gender balanced 
board X Woman 
leadership 
  –0.0153 (0.0092)   
–0.0114 
(0.0079)   
0.0014 
(0.0061) 
Bank size (log value) –0.0060** (0.0029) 
–0.0062** 
(0.0029) 
–0.0057** 
(0.0028) 
–0.0030 
(0.0046) 
–0.0031 
(0.0045) 
–0.0028 
(0.0045) 
–0.0048 
(0.0083) 
–0.0049 
(0.0084) 
–0.0049 
(0.0085) 
Board size (log value) –0.0001 (0.0009) 
0.0001 
(0.0009) 
0.0001 
(0.0013) 
–0.0002 
(0.0012) 
–0.0002 
(0.0012) 
–0.0003 
(0.0012) 
0.0023 
(0.0025) 
0.0022 
(0.0025) 
0.0022 
(0.0025) 
Capital adequacy ratio 0.0858*** (0.0130) 
0.0864*** 
(0.0129) 
0.0860*** 
(0.0247) 
0.0959*** 
(0.0298) 
0.0972*** 
(0.0297) 
0.0969*** 
(0.0296) 
–0.0041 
(0.0127) 
–0.0038 
(0.0126) 
–0.0037 
(0.0126) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1610** (0.0734) 
0.1627** 
(0.0728) 
0.1556** 
(0.0709) 
0.0945 
(0.0839) 
0.0952 
(0.0825) 
0.0899 
(0.0820) 
0.0870 
(0.1370) 
0.0875 
(0.1376) 
0.0875 
(0.1376) 
F test 10.56*** 13.10*** 15.74*** 8.49*** 10.43*** 11.32*** 2.64*** 2.76*** 2.68*** 
R2 (within) 0.3837 0.3849 0.3910 0.3328 0.3393 0.3438 0.0222 0.0217 0.0217 
Observations 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 
All independent variables are lagged one period to avoid endogeneity problems. Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Correlation matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Return on assets 1          
2 Net interest 
margin  0.5592*** 1         
3 Bad loan ratio -0.6434*** -0.0202 1        
4 Capital adequacy 
ratio  0.5291***  0.8058*** -0.0554 1       
5 Women in the 
board  0.1873***  0.3688*** -0.0409  0.4096*** 1      
6 Gender diverse 
board  0.0751*  0.206*** -0.0466  0.2534***  0.6622*** 1     
7 Chairwoman -0.0293 -0.0892** -0.0120 -0.0462  0.2493***  0.1707*** 1    
8 Female CEO  0.0142 -0.0025 -0.0111 -0.0531 -0.1838*** -0.1001** -0.0705* 1   
9 Female Chair 
and/or CEO -0.0033 -0.0504 -0.0162 -0.0717* -0.0270  0.0042  0.4787***  0.8421*** 1  
10 Total assets (ln) -0.2101*** -0.4809***  0.0130 -0.5703*** -0.4103*** -0.2933*** -0.0333  0.0140 -0.0057 1 
11 Board size  0.0894** -0.0151 -0.0742*  0.0891**  0.1645*** -0.0457  0.1065** -0.1307*** -0.0575  0.0588 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table A2. Fixed-effects regression results: Non-linear relationship between the proportion of 
women directors and performance 
 Return on assets (ROA) Net intermediation margin Bad loan ratio 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Rate of women 
in the board 
0.0031 
(0.0084) 
–0.0034 
(0.0151) 
0.0051 
(0.0074) 
–0.0193 
(0.0159) 
–0.0042 
(0.0088) 
–0.0008 
(0.0206) 
Rate of women 
in the board 
(squared term) 
 0.0119 (0.0182)  
0.0447 
(0.0248)  
–0.0062 
(0.0255) 
Chairwoman –0.0066 (0.0042) 
–0.0066 
(0.0046) 
–0.0055 
(0.0038) 
–0.0055 
(0.0048) 
–0.0034* 
(0.0019) 
–0.0034 
(0.0022) 
Woman as CEO –0.0011 (0.0077) 
–0.0012 
(0.0078) 
–0.0038 
(0.0034) 
–0.0043 
(0.0053) 
–0.0082** 
(0.0037) 
–0.0081** 
(0.0037) 
Bank size (log 
value) 
–0.0060** 
(0.0029) 
–0.0061** 
(0.0030) 
–0.0030 
(0.0046) 
–0.0033 
(0.0044) 
–0.0048 
(0.0083) 
–0.0048 
(0.0084) 
Board size (log 
value) 
–0.0001 
(0.0009) 
0.0001 
(0.0013) 
–0.0002 
(0.0012) 
–0.0001 
(0.0012) 
0.0023 
(0.0025) 
0.0023 
(0.0025) 
Capital 
adequacy ratio 
0.0858*** 
(0.0130) 
0.0861*** 
(0.0250) 
0.0959*** 
(0.0298) 
0.0970*** 
(0.0292) 
–0.0041 
(0.0127) 
0.0863 
(0.1374) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1610** (0.0734) 
0.1624** 
(0.0729) 
0.0945 
(0.0839) 
0.0996 
(0.0814) 
0.0870 
(0.1370) 
0.0875 
(0.1376) 
F test 10.56*** 10.88*** 8.49*** 9.66*** 2.64*** 2.47*** 
R2 (within) 0.3837 0.3839 0.3328 0.3369 0.0222 0.0222 
Observations 516 516 516 516 516 516 
All independent variables are lagged one period to avoid endogeneity problems. Robust standard errors 
are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Table A3. Gender diversity in the board of directors 
 Uniform (men controlled board) 
Skewed 
(0% < women < 20%) 
Tilted 
(20% < women < 40%) 
Balanced 
(40% < women < 60%) 
2000 0.4375 (0.5013) 0.2500 (0.4376) 0.2500 (0.4376) 0.0625 (0.2446) 
2001 0.4681 (0.5044) 0.1915 (0.3977) 0.2340 (0.4280) 0.1064 (0.3117) 
2002 0.3191 (0.4712) 0.2979 (0.4623) 0.3191 (0.4712) 0.0638 (0.2471) 
2003 0.3478 (0.4815) 0.2391 (0.4313) 0.3261 (0.4740) 0.0870 (0.2849) 
2004 0.4048 (0.4968) 0.2381 (0.4311) 0.2857 (0.4572) 0.0714 (0.2607) 
2005 0.3571 (0.4850) 0.2619 (0.4450) 0.3095 (0.4679) 0.0714 (0.2607) 
2006 0.3571 (0.4850) 0.2619 (0.4450) 0.3095 (0.4679) 0.0714 (0.2607) 
2007 0.3256 (0.4741) 0.2791 (0.4539) 0.2326 (0.4275) 0.1628 (0.3735) 
2008 0.3256 (0.4741) 0.2326 (0.4275) 0.3023 (0.4647) 0.1395 (0.3506) 
2009 0.3256 (0.4741) 0.2326 (0.4275) 0.3256 (0.4741) 0.1163 (0.3244) 
2010 0.3023 (0.4647) 0.2326 (0.4275) 0.3023 (0.4647) 0.1628 (0.3735) 
2011 0.2791 (0.4539) 0.2093 (0.4116) 0.3953 (0.4947) 0.1163 (0.3244) 
2012 0.2619 (0.4450) 0.2143 (0.4153) 0.3333 (0.4771) 0.1905 (0.3974) 
Total 0.3485 (0.4769) 0.2417 (0.4285) 0.3012 (0.4592) 0.1086 (0.3114) 
Standard deviation is presented in brackets.  
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Table A4. Fixed-effects regression results: The effect of different levels of gender diversity and 
performance 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
Net intermediation 
margin Bad loan ratio 
Men controlled board (100%) –0.0019 (0.0111) 
–0.0082 
(0.0128) 
0.0030 
(0.0127) 
Skewed board (<20%) –0.0284 (0.0465) 
–0.0427 
(0.0411) 
–0.0610 
(0.0765) 
Tilted board (20%-40%) –0.0030 (0.0080) 
0.0147 
(0.0093) 
0.0105 
(0.0227) 
Balanced board (40%-60%) 0.0182* (0.0098) 
0.0273** 
(0.0136) 
–0.0094 
(0.0131) 
Woman leadership  
(Chairperson or CEO) 
–0.0036 
(0.0052) 
–0.0049 
(0.0039) 
–0.0058** 
(0.0023) 
Bank size (log value) –0.0059 (0.0040) 
–0.0029 
(0.0044) 
–0.0041 
(0.0086) 
Board size (log value) 0.0001 (0.0013) 
–0.0001 
(0.0013) 
0.0021 
(0.0025) 
Capital adequacy ratio 0.0856*** (0.0249) 
0.0969*** 
(0.0289) 
–0.0058 
(0.0129) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1617** (0.0735) 
0.0952 
(0.0825) 
0.0856 
(0.1365) 
F test 10.81*** 8.74*** 2.36*** 
R2 (within) 0.3833 0.3386 0.0231 
Observations 516 516 516 
All independent variables are lagged one period to avoid endogeneity problems. Robust standard errors 
are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 
Table A5. Instrumental variable (IV-2SLS) estimates of the effect of boards’ gender 
configuration on performance 
 Return on assets (ROA) Net intermediation margin Bad loan ratio 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel A: 2SLS 
estimates 
      
Rate of women 
in the board 
0.0656 
(0.2113)  
0.1356 
(0.1165)  
0.0425 
(0.0994)  
Gender 
balanced board  
0.0773* 
(0.0453)  
0.0495* 
(0.0294)  
–0.0062 
(0.0255) 
Bank size (log 
value) 
0.0030 
(0.0075) 
–0.0029* 
(0.0017) 
–0.0035 
(0.0030) 
–0.0016 
(0.0012) 
–0.0059 
(0.0093) 
–0.0048 
(0.0084) 
Board size (log 
value) 
–0.0009 
(0.0013) 
–0.0024* 
(0.0014) 
–0.0007 
(0.0009) 
–0.0019* 
(0.0010) 
0.0021 
(0.0028) 
0.0023 
(0.0025) 
Capital 
adequacy ratio 
0.0690*** 
(0.0193) 
0.1895*** 
(0.0253) 
0.2012*** 
(0.0358) 
0.1885*** 
(0.0181) 
0.0015 
(0.0157) 
0.0863 
(0.1374) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept –0.0604 (0.1053) 
0.1103** 
(0.0396) 
0.1086* 
(0.0648) 
0.0689** 
(0.0285) 
0.0977 
(0.1480) 
0.0875 
(0.1376) 
F test 4.12** 4.56*** 4.92*** 5.58*** 3.02*** 1.64* 
R2 (within) 0.0624 0.0891 0.1337 0.2012 0.0178 0.0122 
Panel B: First 
stage estimates       
Chairwoman 0.0625* (0.0368) 
0.7915** 
(0.3472) 
0.0625* 
(0.0368) 
0.7915** 
(0.3472) 
0.0625* 
(0.0368) 
0.7915** 
(0.3472) 
Intercept 0.5238*** (0.0786) 
0.6059*** 
(0.2009) 
0.5238*** 
(0.0786) 
0.6059*** 
(0.2009) 
0.5238*** 
(0.0786) 
0.6059*** 
(0.2009) 
F test 2.38** 5.43*** 2.38** 5.43*** 2.38** 5.43*** 
R2 (within) 0.0450 0.0743 0.0450 0.0743 0.0450 0.0743 
Observations 516 516 516 516 516 516 
Panel A presents the 2SLS estimates instrumenting boards’ gender configuration—in our case, the 
proportion of women in the boardroom and the ‘gender balanced board’ dummy—with the presence of a 
Chairwoman (dummy variable). Note that, to avoid endogeneity problems, all independent variables in 
Panel A are lagged one period while the ‘Chairwoman’ dummy variable is lagged two periods in Panel B. 
Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 
